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Varieties of Democracy, or V-Dem for short, is approaching the conceptualization and measurement 
of democracy on the notions that democracy is multifaceted conceptually, and a matter of degree 
from a measurement perspective (Coppedge et al. 2015a, b, Lindberg et al. 2015). This is fully in 
line with my own position on this issue.1 For example, as a core institution of electoral democracy, 
multiparty elections are supposedly the only means to decide who holds legislative and executive 
power respectively. Yet, de jure multiparty elections take place in less than democracies too and 
elections, pace the political system writ large, can be characterized by varying degrees of democratic 
features ranging from zero to a theoretical maximum. The same reasoning can be applied to other 
varieties of democracy such as liberal, egalitarian, participatory, or deliberative democracy. This 
reasoning, which I have also pursued elsewhere, translates into viewing democracy as an attribute 
of the political system.2  
An essentially different view is to approach democracy as an object in itself.3 For 
example, identification of a specific regime type conceptualized as democracy by characteristics 
exclusive defining for that particular regime. It would imply democracy to “be” something with 
object-like characteristics. Such is the logic of classical concept formation (Collier and Mahon 
1993; Coppedge 2005; Munck 2001b; Sartori 1984; Schedler 2001a). For instance, it makes little 
sense in this approach to say that democracies are defined by political competition since 
competition in a broad sense is a characteristic of most political systems. The frequency of coups, 
insurgencies and toppling of governments is clearly indicative of the fierce competition in many 
authoritarian contexts. The form of political competition defining democracy would need a more 
precise and unambiguous specification: the struggle for the highest executive and/or legislative 
office is in a democracy playing out in electoral processes constituted by a particular set of rules 
governing candidate, party and voter eligibility criteria, political rights of speech, association and 
information, electoral management bodies, electoral system, district boundaries, campaign 
contributions, voting requirements, rules for complaints and abjuration, and so on.  
It could also be argued that democracy is partly characterized by political participation of 
a particular kind. Political participation in democracies – as different from non-democracies – is 
based on the notion of citizens’ political equality. Individuals, who so wish, should be able to 
form a political party and contest in elections on the same conditions as everyone else. All 
                                                
1 Unsurprisingly so perhaps, given that the present author is also one of the principal investigators of V-Dem, and 
Director of the V-Dem Institute. 
2 Even if a political system would reach the theoretical maximum on all specified indicators of democratic attributes, 
it would not make democracy the object. Objectification is a matter of conceptual analysis, not empirical conclusion. 
If we study water and its qualities for example, finding it to be yellowish or pure does not render the color yellow or 
purity our object of study. For my own work in this area, see e.g. Lindberg 2006, 2009.  
3 The following paragraphs build on material from Lindberg 2006, chapter 2. 
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citizens – of age and mental sanity – should be able to cast their vote based on the principle one 
person, one vote. In the same way as unspecified competition is not defining for democracy, 
political participation in a general sense exists in most systems of rule only that it is characterized 
by patron-client relationships, exclusion, or other non-equal relationships. There are many 
examples of inadequate specifications of “democracy” as well as “authoritarianism” in the 
literature on democratization (e.g. Munck 1994, 2001b). Nevertheless, approaching democracy as 
an object, a “thing”, requires a clear and unambiguous specification of the defining attributes. 
However, we must guard against overstating the degree to which these attributes cohere to define 
democracy as this leads to reification4.  
Debates on democracy as a concept (Collier et al. 2006) has not produced a consensus 
beyond the notion of “rule by the people”. For the V-Dem approach, the solution is to 
conceptualize and measure several of the most accepted theories of democracy: electoral, liberal, 
egalitarian, participatory, and deliberative democracy (Coppedge et al. 2015a, Coppedge et al. n.d. 
2016). Each of these varieties are conceptualized and measured as attributes of political systems 
(or “Country Units” in V-Dem jargon). 
 
Dichotomy or Degrees? 
Definitional discussions in comparative literature are frequently framed by the controversy 
between those who think democracy and non-democracy are best conceptualized as a dichotomy, 
or as two ends on a continuum (e.g. Collier and Adcock 1999). It should be recognized that this 
debate is a false one on one level. Any study has to make a distinction between phenomena that 
are objects of analysis and others that are not. Hence, the researcher always has to make a 
decision on differences in kind such as decide what is a regime that can potentially be a 
democracy, and what is not and therefore excluded from the analysis. Within that class of objects 
defined as units for analysis, however, further choices can be either of the kind-type or the degree 
variant. In the discussion of empirical democracy, scholars like Alvarez et al. (1996), Huntington 
(1991, 11-2), Geddes (1999), and Linz (1975, 184-5) rather vigorously argue in favor of a dicho-
tomous approach. Speaking about democracy as a matter of degree is, in Sartori’s words, a 
“stultifying” exercise in “degreeism” (1987, 184).  
                                                
4 There are other dangers associated with this approach. One of them is the importance ascribed to the cut-off point. 
If the distribution of cases is U-shaped the share of classification error is reduced as most cases are distributed 
towards the ends of a thought continuum. The effect of a particular cut-off point of one particular rather than 
another are relatively small since there are few “grey-zone” cases. But with a distribution that is normal or even ∩-
shaped, the selection of cut-off point naturally plays a greater role in producing the results. Even a small change in 
classificatory criteria will then result in a large number of cases being rearranged. Coppedge (1997) for example, have 
demonstrated that significantly different results emerge depending on which cut-off point is used to classify countries 
as either democracies or non-democracies.  
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I share the position of Levitsky and Adcock (1999) calling for methodological – rather 
than philosophical – justifications. It is quite possible, and I would argue preferable, to work with 
a graded measure of democracy and use that graduation to establish and argue for a particular 
cut-off point between two or more regime types. When the distribution of cases along such a 
continuum is known, the sensitivity to errors by certain cut-off points can be assessed. If one 
starts out with only a dichotomy there is no way such a test can be performed and we will never 
know how great a role the classification criteria played in producing the results. In addition, 
scholars can certainly agree on basic defining characteristics of democracy, excluding purely 
authoritarian systems without necessarily agreeing on the theoretically or empirically valid cut-off 
points. 
It seems that for example, Alvarez et al. (1996) fail to recognize that just because all 
regimes can be unambiguously classified as either democracy or non-democracy on basis of 
systematically generated empirical observations5, does not validate the theoretical argument for a 
binominal classification. The validity of the specification of a concept and its internal 
characteristics lies in its ability to address the research question. Thus, what is important is the 
ability of a dichotomous or a graded concept of democracy to engage in the kind of analysis the 
researcher sets.  
Other scholars like Dahl in his formulation of polyarchy (1971, 2, 8; 1989, 316-7), and 
later Bollen and Jackman (1989, 612-8), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990), and Diamond (1996, 53), 
posit democracy is always a matter of degree with most countries along a continuum between full 
democracy and complete non-democracy. There are two main variants of this argument. The first 
ranks countries along an indexed continuum while the other situates them based on subordinate 
categories from partial to total democracies, referred to – sometimes – as “diminished subtypes”. 
Diamond’s (2002) typology ranging from closed authoritarian to full democracy with four inter-
mediate categories, is frequently used, or adaptations of it, and it is an instance of this kind of 
degreeism that we associate with ordinal variables: we know that there is a difference between the 
categories and that there is a range from lowest/worst to most/best6. What we do not know is 
the exact distance between these categories. I have nothing against ordinal degrees-of-democracy 
approaches except that I think it is preferable if such emanates from a fully interval scale so – just 
                                                
5 This reasoning partly avoids the more technical discussion of random and systematic errors. Alvarez et al. (1996) 
argue – correctly – that the bulk of errors resulting from classification of so-called borderline cases are systematic and 
their effect can therefore be measured and corrected for. They also argue that polychotomous scales generates 
smaller but more errors, while dichotomous scales generates larger but fewer of them. The latter, however, is 
dependent on the distribution of cases as discussed above which cannot be known unless a graded measure is used 
first. 
6 Whereas with nominal variables there is only a difference between categories with no ranking involved. 
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like with dichotomies – the distances between categories and the usefulness of the cut-off points 
can be empirically assed. 
Measures from Bollen (1979), Coppedge and Reinecke (1990), Marshall and Jaggers 
(2002), Polity IV, Bertelsman Transformation Index, the EIU’s Democracy Index and so on, 
have at least the trappings of interval scales (although the strongly bimodal empirical distributions 
of for example Polity IV puts the scale into question). The degree approach tends to specify the 
range from zero to full without specifying a particular cut-off point7. Nevertheless, a cut-off point 
is always possible to identify and many do it even while keeping their graded measures (e.g. 
Coppedge and Reinecke 1990, Polity IV). I share the preference for a graded approach because it 
preserves information needed for research questions pertaining to democratization – which is a 
process whereby a political system becomes increasingly democratic8.  
 
What Democracy Is 
The most fundamental value modern democracy is arguably self-government. It seems to me that 
there is no substantial debate on this matter. But this is not to deny that there are other 
democratic values as well. The only point is to say that self-government as the freedom of 
individual citizens to rule over themselves through a concerted collective process, is logically the 
most fundamental of them all. In other words, the people should rule over itself, or, the people 
are sovereign. This sovereignty must be distributed equally since unequal distribution of 
sovereignty implies in fact that some segments of the people are not sovereign. This is what Locke 
referred to as all men are, or ought to, be considered equal as political beings9 (Locke 1689-
90/1970, 322) and what Dahl calls the “idea of intrinsic equality” (1989, 85). In translating self-
government into reality, however, varying schools of thought have emphasized different sets of 
core values. The V-Dem approach defines five of the thus (and here I quote): 
                                                
7 Leaving aside here the difficult and unresolved issue of how to combine such measures into a single index of 
democracy. While Coppedge and Reinecke (1990) claim to have evidenced that democracy, understood as polyarchy, 
is uni-dimensional, Dahl himself (1971, 1989) and Bollen and Jackman (1989), Hadenius (1992), Vanhanen (1997) 
amongst others find democracy to consist of two or more dimensions. The methodological implications are many 
and complex. Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that if democracy has two or more dimensions, the formula for 
combining these has to be established if indeed we search for a single scale. For example, do we use simple addition 
or multiplication of indicators? In metaphorical terms, are we measuring using meters or square meters; is democracy 
a long line or an area? If three or more dimensions are involved the possible geometric formulas increase to include a 
range of geometric figures. For excellent discussion of this and other intricate problems of measuring democracy, see 
Coppedge (2003), and Munck (2001a, 2001b). 
8 Needless to say, this is a conceptual point and should not be mistaken for a tautological empirical theory. 
9 At the time, of course, men meant just free men excluding the vast majority of the population. Without any 
intention of downplaying its significance, the difference is a matter of citizenship and not democratic principle, 
hence, is not central to the discussion here. 
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“The electoral principle of democracy embodies the core value of making rulers responsive 
to citizens through periodic elections. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is 
captured by Robert Dahl’s (1971, 1989) conceptualization of “polyarchy.” It is the idea that 
democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the 
electorate’s approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are 
the critical instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Following 
Dahl, we also count the existence of freedom of association that goes beyond political parties, a 
free media and freedom of expression ensuring possibilities for enlightened understanding in 
selecting leaders, and alternative sources of information on the (in)actions of political elites. 
Although many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing 
electoral contestation (e.g., additional civil liberties and an independent judiciary), these factors 
are often viewed as secondary to electoral institutions (Dahl 1956; Przeworski et al. 2000; 
Schumpeter 1950) and in the V-Dem scheme are classified as aspects of other principles of 
democracy.  
In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral principle is important for all other 
conceptions of democracy. We also consider it fundamental: we would not want to call a regime 
without elections “democratic” in any sense. At the same time, countries can have “democratic 
qualities” without being complete polyarchies. We see it as a continuum.  
We also recognize that the electoral principle in itself does not capture various understandings 
of democracy that emphasize non-electoral properties and that critique electoral democracy as 
being insufficient. These critiques have given rise to additional principles, each of which is 
designed to correct one or more limitations of electoral democracy. 
• The liberal principle of democracy stresses the intrinsic value of protecting individual rights 
against potential “tyranny of the majority” and state repression. This is achieved through 
constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and effective checks and 
balances that limit the use of executive power. These are seen as defining features of the 
liberal aspect of democracy, not simply as aids to political competition. The liberal model 
takes a negative view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the 
limits placed on government.10 
• The majoritarian principle of democracy reflects the idea that the will of the majority should 
be sovereign. Accordingly, democracy is improved if it ensures that the many prevail over 
the few in terms of making decisions and act on policy issues thus boosting what is often 
referred to as governing capacity. This also reflects the ideal that one party should clearly be 
accountable to the electorate in order to make responsiveness possible. To facilitate this, 
political institutions should centralize and concentrate, rather than disperse, power (within 
the context of competitive elections). This may be facilitated by a unitary constitution, 
                                                
10 See Dahl (1956) on “Madisonian Democracy”; see also Gordon (1999), Hamilton, Madison & Jay (1992), Hayek 
(1960), Held (2006, ch. 3), Hirst (1989), Mill (1958), Vile (1998). 
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unicameralism, plurality electoral laws (or majoritarian two-round systems) leading to two-
party systems, governing party domination of legislative committees, no constitutional 
provisions for supermajorities, no or weak judicial review, and so forth—in other words, 
few veto players.11  
• The consensual principle of democracy is in several ways the opposite to the majoritarian 
vision and emphasizes that the political institutions should encourage, in the extreme, 
mandate the inclusion of as many political perspectives as possible. Accordingly, democracy 
is improved in the consensual sense if it makes it easier for small groups to be represented 
in the political system and make their voices heard, and that require the national head of 
government to share power with other political actors and bodies. This also reflects the 
ideal that responsiveness is accomplished when each interest can have its own party 
represented. Consensual democracy therefore emphasizes proportional electoral laws 
making large party systems possible, having two (or more) legislative chambers, forming 
oversized multiparty cabinets, separating national and subnational political units 
(federalism), constitutional provisions of supermajorities, strong judicial review, among 
other attributes.12 
• The participatory principle of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and active 
participation by citizens in all political processes. It is usually viewed as a lineal descendant 
of the “direct” (i.e., non-representative) model of democracy. The motivation for 
participatory democracy is uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: 
delegating authority to representatives. Direct rule and involvement by citizens is preferred, 
wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the 
participatory element is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model 
of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing turnout (actual voting) as well as 
non-electoral forms of participation such as citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, 
juries, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen 
engagement.13 
• The deliberative principle of democracy enshrines the core value that political decisions in 
pursuit of the public good should be informed by respectful and reason-based dialogue at 
all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or 
coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of 
existing preferences. It therefore focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a 
polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common 
good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary 
attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. There should also be respectful dialogue at all 
levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent 
participants who are open to persuasion (Dryzek 2010: 1). “The key objective,” writes 
David Held (2006: 237), “is the transformation of private preferences via a process of 
deliberation into positions that can withstand public scrutiny and test.” Some political 
                                                
11 See American Political Science Association (1950), Bagehot (1963), Ford (1967), Goodnow (1900), Lijphart (1999), 
Lowell 1889), Ranney (1962), Schattschneider (1942), Wilson (1956). 
12 Our definition of consensus democracy is almost identical to Lijphart’s formal definition of consensus democracy 
(Lijphart 1999, 3-4). However, Lijphart’s book, and his prior work on consociationalism, imply that his version of 
consensus democracy is designed to foster the inclusion of different religious, linguistic, or ethnic communities. We 
prefer to include these attributes in our egalitarian principle. See  also Mansbridge (1983) and Powell (2000). 
13 See Barber (1988), Benelo & Roussopoulos (1971), Dewey (1916), Fung & Wright (2003), Macpherson (1977), 
Mansbridge (1983), Pateman (1976), Rousseau (1984), Young (2000). 
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institutions serve a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, 
panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more 
deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of 
deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just 
those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.14 
• The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit 
the actual use formal political (electoral) rights and liberties. It therefore addresses the goal 
of political equality across social groups – as defined by income, wealth, education, 
ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive 
characteristics. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal de jure and de facto capabilities to 
participate; to serve in positions of political power; to put issues on the agenda; and to 
influence policymaking. (This does not entail equality of power between leaders and 
citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.) Following the literature 
in this tradition, gross inequalities of health, education, or income are understood to inhibit 
the exercise of political power and the de facto enjoyment of political rights. Hence, a more 
equal distribution of these resources across social groups may be needed in order to achieve 
political equality.15” 
(Quoted from: Coppedge et al. 2015a, p.20-23) 
The principles behind, and V-Dem’s methodology for constructing indices for these 
varieties of democracy is documented in Coppedge et al. 2015b, and in Skaaning et al. nd  2016. 
Each of these democracy-indices builds on combining several component, and often sub-
component, indices. For the construction of these component, and sub-component indices, see 
descriptions in the Codebook (Coppedge t al. 2015c) as well as several working papers on the 
polyarchy and the executive index (Teorell & Lindberg 2015, nd 2016) on a long series of 
component and subcomponent indices (Teorell et al. nd 2016), on the party system 
institutionalization index (Hicken 2015), on the civil society core index (Bernard et al 2015), on 
the female empowerment index (Wang et al. 2015), and on the new egalitarian component index 
and its subcomponent indices (Sigman & Lindberg 2015).16  
All the V-Dem indices (regardless of level of aggregation) are normalized and scaled from 0 
to 1. This is fully in line with the conceptual argument above and useful for most sorts of linear 
regression techniques, including standard time-series, as well as cross sectional analyses.  
                                                
14 See Bohman (1998), Elster (1998), Fishkin (1991), Gutmann & Thompson (1996), Habermas (1984, 1996), Held 
(2006, ch. 9), Offe (1997). A number of recent studies have attempted to grapple with this concept empirically; see 
Bächtiger (2005), Dryzek (2009), Mutz (2008), Ryfe (2005), Steiner et al. (2004), Thompson (2008). 
15 See Ake (1999), Berman (2006), Bernstein (1961, 1996), Dahl (1982, 1989), Dewey (1916, 1930), Dworkin (1987, 
2000), Gould (1988), Lindblom (1977), Meyer (2007), Offe (1983), Sen (1999), Walzer & Miller (1995). Many of the 
writings cited previously under participatory democracy might also be cited here. Taking a somewhat different stand 
on this issue, Beetham (1999) and Saward (1998: 94-101) do not request an equal distribution of resources. Rather, 
they consider access to basic necessities in the form of health care, education, and social security to be democratic 
rights as they make participation in the political process possible and meaningful. 
16 At the lowest level are the individual indicators drawn from the 400 or so V-Dem collects data on (for aggregation 
of coder-ratings to country-year indicators at the lowest level, see Pemstein et al. 2015). 
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However, there are several other empirical strategies that are critical for important research 
questions in democratization (as well as for other substantial topics of course). Allow me just to 
mention a couple. One obvious need present in many cases is classification. Interval scales like V-
Dem’s indices ranging from 0 to 1 without any thresholds are necessarily unhelpful in this regard. 
While we learn a lot about smaller and bigger differences between countries in terms of degrees, 
we end up knowing nothing about which countries can be considered “democracies” in one 
understanding of the word or another, and which ones are not democracies. This is essential for 
survival analyses (e.g. seeking to answer the question “what makes democracy survive?”), but also 
for any analysis of democratization where that word is understood as “successful transition to 
democracy”. Both these types of inquiries, requires imposing one or more thresholds if one starts 
with an interval scale. Or, if one desire a classification with higher degrees of fine tuning, we may 
want to analyze the differences between say minimally democratic countries and “fully” 
democratic ones, or to look at which types of autocratic regimes are more prone to becoming 
democracies such as closed autocracies and electoral authoritarian regimes. Again, an interval 
scale for all its beauty and advantages, does not help us address such topics. 
Another substantially really important area of research, highly understudied until now, 
concerns sequences of democratization. There exist a number of approaches to identify 
sequences in time series data that are more or less inspired from evolutionary biology17 e.g. social 
sequence analyses that are inspired by DNA sequence analyses (e.g. Abbott 1995; Abbot & Tsay 
2000, Gauthier et al. 2010, Casper and Wilson 2015), qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) that 
are inspired by studies of evolutionary sequences (Ragin 1987; Rihoux & Ragin 2009), and time-
series cross-section methods (Beck 2008). There also exists a more novel approach using 
Bayesian modelling to construe dynamic systems indicating flow of change (Ranganathan et al. 
2014; Spaiser et al. 2014). In many ways, what the suggested analyses do is similar to what many 
readers will recognize as a Granger-test for time-series data, and some aspects probably remind 
readers of the standard technique of lagging variables in time-series, cross-sectional (TSCS) 
analyses.  
There is one critical – and advantageous – difference between Granger-tests and the use of 
lags in TSCS and the combination of tools proposed here. The frequency and dependency 
analyses as well as the graphical approach presented below do not depend on specifying a specific 
time interval. We all know that the one or two, sometimes five, year intervals typically used are 
typically arbitrary and lack theoretical justifications. We do not know if, for example, 
improvements in civil liberties such as the freedom of discussion should be expected to be 
                                                
17 The following paragraphs borrows from Lindenfors et al nd 2015. 
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associated with improvements in say how clean elections are, one, five, ten or more years down 
the road. Furthermore, we have no theoretical reasons to (as standard techniques forces us to) 
assume that the time-lag between changes in X and changes in Y are expected to be constant 
across countries and over time. To the contrary, in some areas we have empirically based 
intuitions suggesting that we should expect time-variant time-lags.  
The methods mentioned above (and adaptations for social science data structured like V-
Dem data is discussed in detail in Lindenfors et al. nd 2015; for an application see Wang et al. 
2015) does not require us to make any assumptions about either cross-section nor time-invariant 
distances in time between X and Y. This is due to the reshaping of the observational data into 
“states” and changes between “states”. A “state” simply means a fixed value i on variable x for a 
period of time t. This structuring of the data then makes it possible to map and analyze identical 
sequences of change, even if the length of time that country A and country B are in various 
“states” vary across time and space. 
Combining a series of such bivariate analyses (by essentially run all variables against all), 
one can establish long series of sequences involving hundreds of variables. The result is a detailed 
and empirically based “map” of which aspects of a phenomenon are more or less necessary 
conditions of other aspects. In other words, we are now capable of providing the first solution to 
presenting detailed sequences of democratization, and other similar phenomena. In order to 
generate readable results, this necessitates turning interval variables into identifiable ordinal 
variables. Hence, the V-Dem indices that are normalized on a scale from 0 to 1 are in need of a 
set of transformation rules to generate ordinal equivalents with three, four, and five states, or 
values.  
First of all, since the V-Dem indices are scaled from 0 to 1, we can assume that as a general 
rule equidistant thresholds for a categorical version make sense. At the same time, for the 
roughest categorization with only three levels, we assume that the break point between being 
closer to the endpoint (.5) is critical for a distinction between country-years that are closer to the 
top/most democratic end of the scale, than to the most autocratic state. Thus for this 
categorization, we start with the .5 threshold and then further subdivide the lower category at .25. 
Visual face validity checks comparing the results of such an approach with the original interval 
values have also corroborated our intuition (based on inspecting some 4,000 graphs). Thus for 
most indices, we have applied the following generic rule for the 3-level ordinal  categorization, 
where I denotes “index”: 
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3 CATEGORIES 
0.0: if I >=0 & I <=0.25 
0.5: if I >0.25 & I <=0.5 
1.0: if I >0.5 & I <=1 
Correlations between the original interval indices and the ordinal versions with only three 
levels (as well as with one-year lagged versions of both) are surprisingly high across the over 20 
indices, typically ranging from around .91 to .97. The main exception is the Direct Democracy 
Index (v2xdd_dd) were some correlations were at .77 to .80.  Hence, caution is advised if and 
when using the 3-level version of this index. All correlations reported here are found in the 
appendix to this paper. 
Further analysis of the results from different options for the 4-level and 5-level ordinal 
versions, demonstrated that the assumption of equidistance matched the structure of the data 
very well, and produced high levels of face validity, as well as very strong correlations. Thus, for 
these versions, the following and most intuitive and mathematically “neutral” rules were applied: 
4 CATEGORIES 
0.00: if I >=0 & I <=0.25 
0.33: if I >0.25 & I <=0.5 
0.67: if I >0.5 & I <=0.75 
1.00: if I >0.75 & I <=1 
 
5 CATEGORIES 
0.00: if I >=0 & I <=0.2 
0.25: if I >0.2 & I <=0.4 
0.50: if I >0.4 & I <=0.6 
0.75: if I >0.6 & I <=0.8 
1.00: if I >0.8 & I <=1 
 
Again, correlations between these versions and the original indices, as well as with lagged 
versions of both, are very high typically around .96 to .98. The Direct Democracy Index is again 
the main exception to this, with correlations at the .77 to .84 levels and caution is advised once 
more. Face validity is also high. Below are graphs for one country that has seen several drastic 
changes in regime status over the years, Ghana. In the first one, V-Dem’s original, interval-scale 
index for Liberal Democracy is plotted against the ordinal versions that have three, four, and five 
categories respectively. 
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The blue line depicts the original Liberal Democracy index with a number of significant 
swings up and down over the over sixty years displayed here. Naturally, the ordinal versions of 
the index with the greater number of levels (4C and 5C) follow the trajectories of the original 
index more closely than the cruder three-level index. But as the reader can see, the overall 
developments are captured in very similar ways across the versions of the indices. Ghana’s 
independence in 1957 , the coup unseating Kwame Nkrumah in 1966, the renewed elections in 
1969, the return to military rule in 1972 when General Acheampong took power, the democratic 
interlude 1979-1981 followed by Jerry J. Rawlings autocratic rule until the opening in 1991 and 
elections in 1992. The Five-level ordinal version also picks up the first turnover to the NPP-
government in the elections in 2000. The authors has produced many thousands of such graphs 
across all indices produced by V-Dem, and inspected them for face validity. Generally, the 
example above from Ghana is pretty representative. Most cases look like this. Hence, when one 
have the need for an ordinal version of one of the indices for sequence analysis or maximum-
likelihood estimations, the indices produced here (and found in Section B of the V-Dem 
Codebook), are good alternatives.  
For the V-Dem index for electoral democracy (v2x_polyarchy) and the related but more 
narrowly defined index for elections (v2x_EDcomp_thick), analysis provide strong evidence that 
a categorization with high face validity and high correlations is dependent on capturing a 
conditional relationship to two critical variables when it comes to the 3- and 4-level 
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categorizations. The two key variables measure to what extent elections are multiparty 
(v2elmulpar) and to what extent the elections were overall free and fair (v2elfrfair).  
Generally, it was face validity analyses that provided the strongest empirical basis for this 
conclusion. With the “cruder” categorizations of only three or four levels using only the 
unconditional distance rules for thresholds as for most other indices, it was clear that countries 
just slightly above a threshold could be of very varying democratic quality. This is the result of the 
aggregation rule for the original interval V-Dem index for electoral democracy, which is in part 
multiplicative and in part additive: 
v2x_polyarchy=  
.1*v2x_suffr + .1*v2xel_frefair + .1*v2x_accex + .1*v2x_frassoc_thick 
+ .1*v2x_freexp_thick  
+ .5* v2x_suffr * v2xel_frefair * v2x_accex * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_freexp_thick 
 
Thus for example, countries with full suffrage, substantial freedom of expression and 
some level of freedom of association but completely fraudulent elections can by the additive term 
reach a similar level to a country with decent elections but more of issues with for example 
freedom of expression. In the end, the following “ordinalization rules” provide high 
correspondence between the original values of the indices, and highest face validity (again based 
on inspection of thousands of graphs, each covering some 100 years of political history for a 
particular country): 
3 CATEGORIES 
0.0: if v2x_polyarchy>=0 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.25 
0.0: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elmulpar_osp>=0 & v2elmulpar_osp<=2.5  
0.0: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elfrfair _osp>=0 & v2elfrfair _osp<=2  
0.5: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elmulpar_osp>2.5 & v2elmulpar_osp<=4 
0.5: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elfrfair_osp>2 & v2elfrfair_osp<=4 
0.5: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5 & v2x_polyarchy<=1  
& v2elfrfair_osp>=0 & v2elfrfair_osp<3  
1.0: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5 & v2x_polyarchy<=1  
& v2elfrfair_osp>=3 & v2elfrfair_osp<=4 
 
4 CATEGORIES 
0.00: if v2x_polyarchy>=0 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.25  
0.00: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elmulpar_osp>=0 & v2elmulpar_osp<=2  
0.00: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elfrfair _osp>=0 & v2elfrfair _osp<=2  
0.33: if v2x_polyarchy>=0.250001 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elmulpar_osp>2 & v2elmulpar_osp<=4 
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0.33: if v2x_polyarchy>0.25 & v2x_polyarchy<=0.5  
& v2elfrfair _osp>2 & v2elfrfair _osp<=4 
0.67: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5   & v2x_polyarchy<=1  
& v2elfrfair_osp>2 & v2elfrfair _osp<3 & v2elmulpar_osp>2 
1.00: if v2x_polyarchy>0.5   & v2x_polyarchy<=1  
& v2elfrfair_osp>3 & v2elmulpar_osp>3 
 
The same logic and conditions then applies to transformation to ordinal versions of the 
electoral component index (v2x_EDcomp_thick) and the clean elections index (v2x_el_frefair). 
The correlations are again very high with the expected pattern of higher correlations the greater 
number of levels in the categorical versions of the indices, but all typically above .96. 
But even more importantly (one can argue), the tracking of the ordinal versions of the 
indices with the original interval scale over time for the 173 countries in the V-Dem dataset, 
display a very high level of face validity. In the process of testing many alternative thresholds and 
inspecting almost 10,000 country graphs, these thresholds and conditions seem to make a lot of 
sense. Below, I have inserted the graphs for the Electoral Demcoracy Index. We stay with the 
Ghanaian example. 
 
Again, the “crude” ordinal versions track almost surprisingly well on the Electoral 
Democracy index. There are occasional “wide swings” up and down when a country oscillates 
around one of the thresholds, but there are surprisingly few of those. And it is an unavoidable 
effect of categorizing unless you implement some smoothing function/time rule to essentially 
ignore those swings in the original indices. The country graphs for all indices and countryes are 
available for inspection on request to the author, as so is the complete STATA do-file for 
generating indices. Appendix B reports on all correlations. 
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Conclusion 
This paper makes the argument that for many descriptive purposes, as well as a series of 
important analytical endeavors, interval indices are not particularly useful (despite their many 
important advantages). Indices like all the ones V-Dem produces are thus in need of ordinal 
versions allowing for survival analyses, classification of regime categories, understanding and 
explaining successful transitions to democracy, breakdown of democratic regimes, as well as for 
the emerging area of sequence analysis. 
Second, this paper advances a set of coding rules that transforms the existing, original V-
Dem indices to ordinal indices with three, four and five levels respectively. Users can determine 
which level of distinction is most useful for the research project, or the task of descriptive 
representation at hand. For the democracy indices that V-Dem supplies at the highest level of 
aggregation, the paper also suggests a classification of the levels into varying regime types. 
The resulting three ordinal versions of all of the 35 V-Dem indices are validated both by 
high correlations with the original indices, as well as by inspection of face validity over some over 
10,000 graphs, each one comparing one of the three ordinal versions with the original index from 
1900 to 2012 for a particular country. 
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Appendix A:  Correlations 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	.	corr	v2x_polyarchy	l.v2x_polyarchy	v2x_poly3cC	l.v2x_poly3cC	v2x_poly4c	l.v2x_poly4c	v2x_poly5C2		l.v2x_poly5C2	(obs=15,526)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_po~y	v2x_po~y	v2x_po~C	v2x_po~C	v2x_po~c	v2x_po~c	v2x_po~2	v2x_po~2	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2x_polyar~y	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9896			1.0000		v2x_poly3cC	|										--.	|			0.9341			0.9210			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9228			0.9340			0.9703			1.0000			v2x_poly4c	|										--.	|			0.9386			0.9267			0.9773			0.9534			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9269			0.9386			0.9511			0.9773			0.9731			1.0000		v2x_poly5C2	|										--.	|			0.9805			0.9703			0.9130			0.9035			0.9183			0.9082			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9690			0.9804			0.9006			0.9130			0.9074			0.9184			0.9824			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_libdem	l.v2x_libdem	v2x_libdem3cC	l.v2x_libdem3cC	v2x_libdem4c	l.v2x_libdem4c	v2x_libdem	5C	l.v2x_libdem5C	(obs=15,790)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_li~m	v2x_li~m	v2x_li..	v2x_li..	v2x_li..	v2x_li..	v2x_li..	v2x_li..	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------			v2x_libdem	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9914			1.0000	v2x_libde~cC	|										--.	|			0.9517			0.9413			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9430			0.9517			0.9780			1.0000	v2x_libdem4c	|										--.	|			0.9675			0.9596			0.9727			0.9562			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9584			0.9671			0.9531			0.9729			0.9833			1.0000	v2x_libdem5C	|										--.	|			0.9781			0.9705			0.9369			0.9295			0.9671			0.9581			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9690			0.9779			0.9266			0.9370			0.9584			0.9669			0.9856			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_partipdem	l.v2x_partipdem	v2x_partipdem3cC	l.v2x_partipdem3cC	v2x_partipdem4c	l.v2x_partipdem4c	v2x_partipdem5C	l.v2x_partipdem5C	(obs=15,781)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_pa~m	v2x_pa~m	~pdem3cC	~pdem3cC	v~pdem4c	v~pdem4c	v~pdem5C	v~pdem5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2x_partip~m	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9924			1.0000	v2x_par~m3cC	|										--.	|			0.9446			0.9379			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9352			0.9442			0.9782			1.0000	v2x_part~m4c	|										--.	|			0.9457			0.9392			0.9961			0.9750			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9363			0.9454			0.9746			0.9961			0.9787			1.0000	v2x_part~m5C	|										--.	|			0.9625			0.9560			0.9274			0.9190			0.9294			0.9210			1.0000	
 
 
24 
									L1.	|			0.9534			0.9623			0.9208			0.9276			0.9230			0.9296			0.9813			1.0000			.	corr	v2x_egaldem3cC	v2x_egaldem3cC	v2x_egaldem4c	(obs=14,449)	|	v2x_e~cC	v2x_e~cC	v~ldem4c	-------------+---------------------------	v2x_egald~cC	|			1.0000	v2x_egald~cC	|			1.0000			1.0000	v2x_egald~4c	|			0.9712			0.9712			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_egaldem	l.v2x_egaldem	v2x_egaldem3cC	l.v2x_egaldem3cC	v2x_egaldem4c	l.v2x_egaldem4c	v2x_egaldem5C	l.v2x_egaldem5C	(obs=14,246)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_eg~m	v2x_eg~m	v2x_e~cC	v2x_e~cC	v~ldem4c	v~ldem4c	v~ldem5C	v~ldem5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------		v2x_egaldem	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9935			1.0000	v2x_egald~cC	|										--.	|			0.9401			0.9325			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9335			0.9402			0.9786			1.0000	v2x_egald~4c	|										--.	|			0.9620			0.9566			0.9712			0.9554			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9546			0.9618			0.9523			0.9714			0.9838			1.0000	v2x_egald~5C	|										--.	|			0.9753			0.9691			0.9245			0.9190			0.9496			0.9435			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9682			0.9751			0.9184			0.9249			0.9453			0.9497			0.9851			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_delibdem	l.v2x_delibdem	v2x_delibdem3cC	l.v2x_delibdem3cC	v2x_delibdem4c	l.v2x_delibdem4c	v2x_delibdem5C	l.v2x_delibdem5C	(obs=15,604)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_de~m	v2x_de~m	v2x_d~cC	v2x_d~cC	v2x_d~4c	v2x_d~4c	v2x_d~5C	v2x_d~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2x_delibdem	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9893			1.0000	v2x_delib~cC	|										--.	|			0.9559			0.9438			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9437			0.9559			0.9731			1.0000	v2x_delib~4c	|										--.	|			0.9678			0.9585			0.9724			0.9518			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9556			0.9676			0.9485			0.9726			0.9788			1.0000	v2x_delib~5C	|										--.	|			0.9781			0.9684			0.9455			0.9344			0.9635			0.9526			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9657			0.9779			0.9320			0.9458			0.9528			0.9634			0.9818			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_freexp	l.v2x_freexp	v2x_freexp3cC	l.v2x_freexp3cC	v2x_freexp4c	l.v2x_freexp4c	v2x_freexp5C	l.v2x_freexp5C	(obs=15,779)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_fr~p	v2x_fr~p	v2x~p3cC	v2x~p3cC	v2x_~p4c	v2x_~p4c	v2x_~p5C	v2x_~p5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------			v2x_freexp	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9864			1.0000	v2x_freex~cC	|	
 
 
25 
									--.	|			0.9138			0.8989			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9006			0.9139			0.9689			1.0000	v2x_freexp4c	|										--.	|			0.9715			0.9576			0.9505			0.9271			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9578			0.9715			0.9256			0.9507			0.9762			1.0000	v2x_freexp5C	|										--.	|			0.9825			0.9686			0.8975			0.8854			0.9534			0.9407			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9687			0.9824			0.8836			0.8974			0.9403			0.9531			0.9796			1.0000		.	corr	v2xme_altinf	l.v2xme_altinf	v2xme_altinf3cC	l.v2xme_altinf3cC	v2xme_altinf4c	l.v2xme_altinf4c	v2xme_altinf5C	l.v2xme_altinf5C	(obs=15,797)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2xme_~f	v2xme_~f	v2xme~cC	v2xme~cC	v2xme~4c	v2xme~4c	v2xme~5C	v2xme~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2xme_altinf	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9873			1.0000	v2xme_alt~cC	|										--.	|			0.9244			0.9103			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9126			0.9243			0.9751			1.0000	v2xme_alt~4c	|										--.	|			0.9763			0.9633			0.9549			0.9364			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9633			0.9762			0.9340			0.9550			0.9801			1.0000	v2xme_alt~5C	|										--.	|			0.9841			0.9714			0.9096			0.8990			0.9596			0.9477			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9711			0.9841			0.8966			0.9091			0.9474			0.9594			0.9817			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_EDcomp_thick	l.v2x_EDcomp_thick	v2x_EDcomp_thick3cC	l.v2x_EDcomp_thick3cC	v2x_EDcomp_thick4c	l.v2x_EDcomp_thick4c	v2x_EDcomp_thick5C	l.v2x_EDcomp_thick5C	(obs=15,470)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_ED~k	v2x_ED~k	v2x_E~cC	v2x_E~cC	v2x_E~4c	v2x_E~4c	v2x_E~5C	v2x_E~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2x_EDcomp~k	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9866			1.0000	v2x_EDcom~cC	|										--.	|			0.9294			0.9126			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9150			0.9294			0.9672			1.0000	v2x_EDcom~4c	|										--.	|			0.9342			0.9185			0.9757			0.9495			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9192			0.9344			0.9469			0.9759			0.9707			1.0000	v2x_EDcom~5C	|										--.	|			0.9813			0.9680			0.9217			0.9079			0.9281			0.9139			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9668			0.9811			0.9046			0.9218			0.9126			0.9285			0.9803			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_frassoc_thick	l.v2x_frassoc_thick	v2x_frassoc_thick3cC	l.v2x_frassoc_thick3cC	v2x_frassoc_thick4c	l.v2x_frassoc_thick4c	v2x_frassoc_thick5C	l.v2x_frassoc_thick5C	(obs=15,973)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	~c_thick	~c_thick	v2x_fr..	v2x_fr..	v2x_fr..	v2x_fr..	v2x_fr..	v2x_fr..	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2x_frasso~k	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9860			1.0000	v2x_frass~cC	|										--.	|			0.9350			0.9182			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9215			0.9347			0.9702			1.0000	
 
 
26 
v2x_frass~4c	|										--.	|			0.9803			0.9656			0.9578			0.9363			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9660			0.9802			0.9332			0.9578			0.9768			1.0000	v2x_frass~5C	|										--.	|			0.9871			0.9731			0.9239			0.9115			0.9651			0.9524			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9733			0.9870			0.9090			0.9235			0.9521			0.9648			0.9803			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_suffr	l.v2x_suffr	v2x_suffr3cC	l.v2x_suffr3cC	v2x_suffr4c	l.v2x_suffr4c	v2x_suffr5C	l.v2x_suffr5C	(obs=15,697)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_su~r	v2x_su~r	v2x_s~cC	v2x_s~cC	v2x_s~4c	v2x_s~4c	v2x_s~5C	v2x_s~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------				v2x_suffr	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9885			1.0000	v2x_suffr3cC	|										--.	|			0.9938			0.9825			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9821			0.9938			0.9877			1.0000		v2x_suffr4c	|										--.	|			0.9927			0.9814			0.9918			0.9800			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9801			0.9926			0.9790			0.9918			0.9872			1.0000		v2x_suffr5C	|										--.	|			0.9982			0.9866			0.9950			0.9831			0.9929			0.9803			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9863			0.9982			0.9832			0.9950			0.9813			0.9928			0.9880			1.0000		.	corr	v2xel_frefair	l.v2xel_frefair	v2xel_frefair3cC	l.v2xel_frefair3cC	v2xel_frefair4c	l.v2xel_frefair4c	v2xel_frefair5C	l.v2xel_frefair5C	(obs=16,117)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2xel_~r	v2xel_~r	v2~ir3cC	v2~ir3cC	v2xe~r4c	v2xe~r4c	v2xe~r5C	v2xe~r5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2xel_fref~r	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9734			1.0000	v2xel_fre~cC	|										--.	|			0.9535			0.9241			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9271			0.9538			0.9611			1.0000	v2xel_fre~4c	|										--.	|			0.9738			0.9496			0.9698			0.9397			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9505			0.9738			0.9375			0.9701			0.9726			1.0000	v2xel_fre~5C	|										--.	|			0.9847			0.9605			0.9432			0.9194			0.9713			0.9500			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9605			0.9847			0.9159			0.9436			0.9488			0.9714			0.9738			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_liberal	l.v2x_liberal	v2x_liberal3cC	l.v2x_liberal3cC	v2x_liberal4c	l.v2x_liberal4c	v2x_liberal5C	l.v2x_liberal5C	(obs=16,791)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_li~l	v2x_li~l	v2~al3cC	v2~al3cC	v2x_~l4c	v2x_~l4c	v2x_~l5C	v2x_~l5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------		v2x_liberal	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9886			1.0000	v2x_liber~cC	|										--.	|			0.9126			0.8988			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9014			0.9128			0.9721			1.0000	v2x_liber~4c	|										--.	|			0.9681			0.9564			0.9541			0.9336			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9571			0.9680			0.9315			0.9544			0.9801			1.0000	
 
 
27 
v2x_liber~5C	|										--.	|			0.9795			0.9679			0.8875			0.8773			0.9466			0.9365			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9682			0.9794			0.8754			0.8878			0.9362			0.9465			0.9820			1.0000		.	corr	v2xcl_rol	l.v2xcl_rol	v2xcl_rol3cC	l.v2xcl_rol3cC	v2xcl_rol4c	l.v2xcl_rol4c	v2xcl_rol5C	l.v2xcl_rol5C	(obs=16,326)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2xcl_~l	v2xcl_~l	v2xcl~cC	v2xcl~cC	v2xcl~4c	v2xcl~4c	v2xcl~5C	v2xcl~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------				v2xcl_rol	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9911			1.0000	v2xcl_rol3cC	|										--.	|			0.9051			0.8946			1.0000										L1.	|			0.8969			0.9053			0.9763			1.0000		v2xcl_rol4c	|										--.	|			0.9699			0.9608			0.9471			0.9299			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9612			0.9698			0.9279			0.9475			0.9824			1.0000		v2xcl_rol5C	|										--.	|			0.9808			0.9715			0.8943			0.8867			0.9530			0.9449			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9721			0.9807			0.8854			0.8942			0.9452			0.9528			0.9842			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_jucon	l.v2x_jucon	v2x_jucon3cC	l.v2x_jucon3cC	v2x_jucon4c	l.v2x_jucon4c	v2x_jucon5C	l.v2x_jucon5C	(obs=16,143)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_ju~n	v2x_ju~n	v2x_j~cC	v2x_j~cC	v2x_j~4c	v2x_j~4c	v2x_j~5C	v2x_j~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------				v2x_jucon	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9927			1.0000	v2x_jucon3cC	|										--.	|			0.9122			0.9037			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9043			0.9123			0.9823			1.0000		v2x_jucon4c	|										--.	|			0.9700			0.9625			0.9479			0.9347			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9627			0.9699			0.9343			0.9480			0.9872			1.0000		v2x_jucon5C	|										--.	|			0.9807			0.9734			0.8946			0.8875			0.9477			0.9411			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9733			0.9806			0.8870			0.8945			0.9410			0.9475			0.9863			1.0000		.	corr	v2xlg_legcon	l.v2xlg_legcon	v2xlg_legcon3cC	l.v2xlg_legcon3cC	v2xlg_legcon4c	l.v2xlg_legcon4c	v2xlg_legcon5C	l.v2xlg_legcon5C	(obs=11,735)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2xlg_~n	v2xlg_~n	v2xlg~cC	v2xlg~cC	v2xlg~4c	v2xlg~4c	v2xlg~5C	v2xlg~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2xlg_legcon	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9888			1.0000	v2xlg_leg~cC	|										--.	|			0.9268			0.9143			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9163			0.9269			0.9776			1.0000	v2xlg_leg~4c	|										--.	|			0.9747			0.9630			0.9496			0.9326			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9633			0.9747			0.9309			0.9499			0.9816			1.0000	v2xlg_leg~5C	|										--.	|			0.9839			0.9725			0.9104			0.9007			0.9583			0.9477			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9730			0.9839			0.8995			0.9105			0.9477			0.9583			0.9838			1.0000	
 
 
28 
	.	corr	v2xdl_delib	l.v2xdl_delib	v2xdl_delib3cC	l.v2xdl_delib3cC	v2xdl_delib4c	l.v2xdl_delib4c	v2xdl_delib5C	l.v2xdl_delib5C	(obs=16,249)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2xdl_~b	v2xdl_~b	v2xdl~cC	v2xdl~cC	v2xdl~4c	v2xdl~4c	v2xdl~5C	v2xdl~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------		v2xdl_delib	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9841			1.0000	v2xdl_del~cC	|										--.	|			0.9187			0.9010			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9036			0.9188			0.9683			1.0000	v2xdl_del~4c	|										--.	|			0.9725			0.9557			0.9518			0.9278			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9562			0.9724			0.9255			0.9521			0.9734			1.0000	v2xdl_del~5C	|										--.	|			0.9823			0.9663			0.9080			0.8940			0.9560			0.9408			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9664			0.9822			0.8915			0.9081			0.9403			0.9558			0.9773			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_egal	l.v2x_egal	v2x_egalC_3c	l.v2x_egalC_3c	v2x_egalC_4c	l.v2x_egalC_4c	v2x_egalC_5C	l.v2x_egalC_5C	(obs=16,321)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_egal	v2x_egal	v2x_e~3c	v2x_e~3c	v2~lC_4c	v2~lC_4c	v2~lC_5C	v2~lC_5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------					v2x_egal	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9954			1.0000	v2x_egalC_3c	|										--.	|			0.9221			0.9158			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9195			0.9228			0.9854			1.0000	v2x_egalC_4c	|										--.	|			0.9734			0.9688			0.9511			0.9424			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9689			0.9736			0.9385			0.9517			0.9879			1.0000	v2x_egalC_5C	|										--.	|			0.9821			0.9770			0.9116			0.9092			0.9549			0.9508			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9778			0.9821			0.9068			0.9123			0.9515			0.9550			0.9894			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_partip	l.v2x_partip	v2x_partipC_3cC	l.v2x_partipC_3cC	v2x_partipC_4c	l.v2x_partipC_4c	v2x_partipC_5C	l.v2x_partipC_5C	(obs=19,786)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_pa~p	v2x_pa~p	v2x~_3cC	v2x~_3cC	v2~pC_4c	v2~pC_4c	v2~pC_5C	v2~pC_5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------			v2x_partip	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9924			1.0000	v2x_par~_3cC	|										--.	|			0.9252			0.9186			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9170			0.9247			0.9777			1.0000	v2x_part~_4c	|										--.	|			0.9288			0.9226			0.9939			0.9724			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9205			0.9283			0.9719			0.9938			0.9787			1.0000	v2x_part~_5C	|										--.	|			0.9509			0.9437			0.8988			0.8923			0.9033			0.8968			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9428			0.9506			0.8948			0.8988			0.8996			0.9033			0.9803			1.0000		
 
 
29 
.	corr	v2x_cspart	l.v2x_cspart	v2x_cspart3cC	l.v2x_cspart3cC	v2x_cspart4c	l.v2x_cspart4c	v2x_cspart5C	l.v2x_cspart5C	(obs=16,082)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_cs~t	v2x_cs~t	v2x_c~cC	v2x_c~cC	v2x_c~4c	v2x_c~4c	v2x_c~5C	v2x_c~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------			v2x_cspart	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9872			1.0000	v2x_cspar~cC	|										--.	|			0.9121			0.8969			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9005			0.9120			0.9703			1.0000	v2x_cspart4c	|										--.	|			0.9732			0.9603			0.9537			0.9331			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9604			0.9731			0.9291			0.9539			0.9781			1.0000	v2x_cspart5C	|										--.	|			0.9813			0.9682			0.8991			0.8886			0.9549			0.9431			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9687			0.9812			0.8852			0.8986			0.9430			0.9545			0.9799			1.0000		.	corr	v2xdd_dd	l.v2xdd_dd	v2xdd_dd3cC	l.v2xdd_dd3cC	v2xdd_dd4c	l.v2xdd_dd4c	v2xdd_dd5C	l.v2xdd_dd5C	(obs=19,819)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2xdd_dd	v2xdd_dd	v2xdd~cC	v2xdd~cC	v2xdd~4c	v2xdd~4c	v2xdd~5C	v2xdd~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------					v2xdd_dd	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9644			1.0000		v2xdd_dd3cC	|										--.	|			0.8025			0.7733			1.0000										L1.	|			0.7713			0.8024			0.9347			1.0000			v2xdd_dd4c	|										--.	|			0.8019			0.7726			0.9986			0.9334			1.0000										L1.	|			0.7707			0.8018			0.9338			0.9986			0.9347			1.0000			v2xdd_dd5C	|										--.	|			0.8410			0.8091			0.8667			0.8259			0.8676			0.8267			1.0000										L1.	|			0.8078			0.8408			0.8263			0.8672			0.8273			0.8680			0.9465			1.0000		.	corr	v2xel_locelec	l.v2xel_locelec	v2xel_locelec3cC	l.v2xel_locelec3cC	v2xel_locelec4c	l.v2xel_locelec4c	v2xel_locelec5C	l.v2xel_locelec5C	(obs=14,572)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2~celec	v2~celec	v2xel_..	v2xel_..	~celec4c	~celec4c	~celec5C	~celec5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2xel_loc~ec	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9920			1.0000	v2xel_loc~cC	|										--.	|			0.9563			0.9472			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9482			0.9562			0.9867			1.0000	v2xel_loc~4c	|										--.	|			0.9589			0.9509			0.9763			0.9650			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9509			0.9588			0.9637			0.9763			0.9889			1.0000	v2xel_loc~5C	|										--.	|			0.9727			0.9650			0.9493			0.9415			0.9460			0.9384			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9642			0.9725			0.9398			0.9494			0.9377			0.9461			0.9896			1.0000		.	corr	v2xel_regelec	l.v2xel_regelec	v2xel_regelec3cC	l.v2xel_regelec3cC	v2xel_regelec4c	l.v2xel_regelec4c	v2xel_regelec5C	l.v2xel_regelec5C	
 
 
30 
(obs=15,314)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2~gelec	v2~gelec	v2xel_..	v2xel_..	~gelec4c	~gelec4c	~gelec5C	~gelec5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------	v2xel_reg~ec	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9921			1.0000	v2xel_reg~cC	|										--.	|			0.9536			0.9450			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9444			0.9535			0.9862			1.0000	v2xel_reg~4c	|										--.	|			0.9650			0.9577			0.9735			0.9624			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9561			0.9649			0.9611			0.9736			0.9890			1.0000	v2xel_reg~5C	|										--.	|			0.9464			0.9395			0.9083			0.8997			0.9346			0.9265			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9389			0.9465			0.9004			0.9086			0.9277			0.9349			0.9894			1.0000		.	corr	v2x_gender	l.v2x_gender	v2x_gender3cC	l.v2x_gender3cC	v2x_gender4c	l.v2x_gender4c	v2x_gender5C	l.v2x_gender5C	(obs=15,903)	|																	L.																L.																L.																L.														|	v2x_ge~r	v2x_ge~r	v2x_g~cC	v2x_g~cC	v2x_g~4c	v2x_g~4c	v2x_g~5C	v2x_g~5C	-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------			v2x_gender	|										--.	|			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9934			1.0000	v2x_gende~cC	|										--.	|			0.9135			0.9054			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9087			0.9139			0.9785			1.0000	v2x_gender4c	|										--.	|			0.9691			0.9624			0.9490			0.9346			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9628			0.9690			0.9315			0.9494			0.9844			1.0000	v2x_gender5C	|										--.	|			0.9814			0.9746			0.8948			0.8909			0.9486			0.9434			1.0000										L1.	|			0.9749			0.9814			0.8877			0.8949			0.9427			0.9483			0.9872			1.0000	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	
 
